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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RESERVATION OF A POWER TO REVOKE IN A LIVING TRUST
NON TESTAMENTARY
When men began to use the living trust as a device for the manage-
ment and disposition of their property, difficult questions of law involving
compliance with the Statute of Wills came before the courts. If the
purported trustee was given little or no powers and the settlor reserved
the power to revoke, a mere agency was created and dispositions in the
instrument effective after death were void because the instrument was
not properly executed. McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank,
201 Mass. 50 (1909). If, however, there was a sufficient delegation
of power to the trustee, a valid trust was created, thus making the dis-
position of property after death effective, although the instrument was
not executed as a valid will. Jones v. Old Colony Trust Company, 25 1
Mass. 309 (925). The amount of control reserved by the settlor over
the res is not the controlling element in determining whether there is a
trustee-beneficiary relationship established or a mere agency, for recent
cases, at least, have held that a reservation of a power to revoke will not
invalidate an otherwise perfect trust. This view is also supported in the
Restatement of Trusts, Section 57, by the American Law Institute.
And certainly there could not possibly be any more control reserved over
the res than the power to revoke the trust. The controlling feature,
then, is how much power the settlor reserves over the trustee. The
M'! cEvoy case and the Jones case are distinguished on this point, for the
amount of control over the res was the same in both cases. It is always
important to bear in mind the distinction between controlling the res
and controlling the trustee. The power to revoke part or all of the
trust would be controlling the res, while the power to direct the trustee
in the management of the estate, in investing and reinvesting trust funds,
in the sale and transfer of property, in formulating policies, etc., are all
powers reserved over the trustee. A power reserved to direct the trustee
to pay over to the settlor any part or all of the estate upon demand, is
but another way of reserving the power to revoke, and should be thought
of as a control over the res rather than the trustee. But this is not to say
that there cannot be a certain amount of control over the trustee. In
the recent case of The Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 9 Ohio Op. 239
(1937), here under review, the court found a valid trust even though
the settlor reserved the following rights: the income during his life; the
free use and enjoyment of the estate during his life; the trustee should
delegate to him, upon demand, the voting rights in certain stocks; the
settlor to be consulted whenever practicable on matters relating to sales
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and reinvestments. However, there was a virogous dissent in this case
by Judge Lieghley, who believed that the settlor had given everything
to the trustee and in the same breath took back everything but the bare
legal title.
In The Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. 159
, 
167 N.E.
389 (1930), the supreme court, relying upon Worthington v. Redkey,
86 Ohio St. 128 (1912), held that the common law effect of a trust
with a reservation of a power to revoke was to make the instrument
testamentary in nature. An early leading case on the point was Stone v.
Hackett, 78 Mass. 227 (1858). The court held in that case that a
power reserved to revoke a trust was perfectly consistent with a valid
trust and did not make the instrument testamentary. So there were two
different views on the common law effect of a power reserved to a
revoke a trust. While Marshall, C. J., positively denounces the holding
of the Hackett case on the ground that a donor should not be able to
reserve a power to revoke a gift made to a donee through the hands of
a third person acting as trustee, when he dearly could not reserve such
a power when making a gift directly to the donee, he, nevertheless, finds
in favor of a trust in the Hawkins case because of the Amendment to
Ohio G. C. 8617 which expressly allows for such power of revocation
without defeating the trust.
In the Hawkins case, it should be noted that not only was there a
reservation of a power to revoke, but there was a provision in the instru-
ment that the trust was to terminate upon the death of the settlor if he
had not revoked it before that time. The plaintiff claimed the effect of
this was to make the instrument testamentary, but the court did not
stress this fact, and dwelt upon the issue whether reserving the power to
revoke defeated the trust or not.
The common law doctrine so strongly announced in the Hawkins
case with respect to the effect of a reservation of a power to revoke may
possibly be on the way out in Ohio because of Cleveland Trust Co. v.
White, supra. The court in that case accepted the rule laid down in
Stone v. Hackett, supra, so strongly condemned in the Hawkins case.
In the White case it is significant that the court both cited and quoted
from the Hackett case and from Section 57 of the Restatement of Trusts
which adopts the rule of that case; and the court totally ignored the use
of the Amendment to Ohio G.C. 8617 which was given a somewhat
strained construction in the Hawkins case. But the problem in the White
case was somewhat eased because there really was not a true reservation
of a power to revoke, for the settlor had to get the consent of the
trustees before he could revoke.
J. A. MARTIN
